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CASE NOTES
Admiralty-Jones Act-Foreign Shipping Corporation Owned By Resident
Alien Held Liable Under Flag-of-Convenience Doctrine.-Plaintiff, a Greek
citizen, brought suit under the Jones Act' against Hellenic Lines, Ltd., a Greek
corporation, and Universal Cargo Carriers, Inc., a Panamanian corporation, for
a shipboard injury that had occurred in the Port of New Orleans upon a Greek
registered vessel of the defendants. The vessel was owned by Universal Cargo
Carriers which, however, was merely a holding corporation with no operational
responsibilities in regard to the vessel. In reality, Universal Cargo Carriers was
a wholly owned subsidiary of Hellenic Lines, and ninety-five per cent of Hellenic
stock was held by a Greek citizen and his son who were resident aliens of Con-
necticut.2 Hellenic Lines was actually the operator of the vessel, and its man-
agerial and operational offices were located in New York City.3 The district
court, upon examining the contacts of the defendants with the United States,
held the defendants liable under the Jones Act.4 In affirming, the court of ap-
peals concluded that defendants' economic and operational contacts with the
United States were so substantial as to justify application of Jones Act liability.
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lauritzen v. Larsen,5 the determin-
ing factors for application of the Jones Act against a foreign shipowner was the
place where the shipping articles were signed, or the locality of the injury., In
1. 46 U.S.C. § 688 et seq. (1964). The Jones Act provides a seaman with a jury trial
for personal injuries: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending
the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the
personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or
regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.
Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant
employer resides or in which his principal office is located." Id. § 688.
2. The Greek citizen was admitted to permanent resident status in 1956-57. Tsakonites v.
Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 US. 1007
(1967); see 8 C.F.R § 245 (1969).
3. The defendant maintained an office of 75 persons in New York City, and an office of
15 persons in New Orleans, as well as numerous other smaller offices throughout its trade
route, including Greece. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919, 921 n.5 (5th Cir.
1969).
4. Rhoditis v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 273 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1967). The plaintiff
brought suit in personam not only under the Jones Act, but also under the general maritime
remedies of maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness. Furthermore, the cargo vessel itself
was sued in rem. See 412 F.2d at 920-21 n.4.
5. 345 US. 571 (1953). For a general discussion of the case see H. Baer, Admiralty Law
of the Supreme Court 59-62 (1963); 1 P. Edelman, Maritime Death and Injury 513-17
(1960); Note, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 237 (1953).
6. If the articles were signed in the United States, or the injury took place there, the
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Lauritzen, however, the Court specifically held these factors not to be per se
determinative. In Lauritzen, a Danish seaman, who signed on a Danish regis-
tered vessel in a United States port and who was injured in Cuban waters, sued
the Danish corporate owner of the vessel under the Jones Act. The Court held
that the law of the flag--i.e., that of the vessel-would be the proper choice in
such a case, since sufficient contacts with the United States to justify the
application of the Jones Act were lacking. The Court outlined by way of
dictum 7 seven factors to be considered in applying the Jones Act to alien seamen
and foreign corporate defendants. Four of these factors-the place of the in-
jury,8 the place of the signing of the articles, 9 the inaccessability of the foreign
forum to the seaman, 10 and the law of the forum"-were considered by the
Court to be of minor importance. The three remaining factors prescribed were
the law of the flag ("the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law
relevant"),12 the allegiance of the defendant shipowner, 18 and the allegiance or
domicile of the injured seaman. 1 4 Since the law of the flag was considered to be
of such "cardinal importance"' 6-because international law requires a mutual
forbearance and respect for another country's flag-it was suggested that some
overpowering counter-balance or weight must be found to offset it if the Jones
Act were to be found applicable. 16
Six years later, in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,17 a Span-
Jones Act was usually held applicable. See Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1945); Lunde v. Skibs A.S. Herstein, 103 F. Supp. 446 (S.).N.Y. 1952). Contra, Sonneson
v. Panama Transp. Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E2d 569 (1948).
7. The actual holding could be narrowly construed to cover only someone In Larsen's
position and not applicable to all Jones Act suits involving aliens. See G. Gilmore & C.
Black, The Law of Admiralty § 6-63, at 387 (1957).
8. See 345 U.S. at 583-84.
9. The place of contracting, although of prime importance in contract cases, Is of
relatively little importance in tort actions such as suits under the Jones Act. See id. at 588;
Kontos v. S.S. Sophie C., 236 F. Supp. 664, 670 (E-D. Pa. 1964).
10. This factor is of importance only when a case of pendent or discretionary jurisdiction
is involved, and may determine whether jurisdiction is to be retained or not, but it Is not
determinative of choice of law. See 345 U.S. at 589-90; Cuozzo v. Italian Line, 168 F. Supp.
304, 306-07 (SM.N.Y. 1958); Markakis v. S.S. The Mparmpa Christos, 161 F. Supp. 487,
489 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
11. This is generally a matter of statutory interpretation. See 345 U.S. at 590-92.
12. Id. at 584.
13. See id. at 587.
14. This factor has not been extremely influential. Although the Court in Lauritzen
seemed to imply that an American citizen-seaman would have the Jones Act available to
him in an action against a foreign steamship company, the courts have not consistently
followed this. See id. at 586; Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967); Smith v. Furness, Withy & Co., 119 F. Supp.
369 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Note, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1400 (1961).
15. 345 U.S. at 584.
16. Id. at 585-86. See also H. Baer, supra note 5, at 59-62; H. Meyers, The Nationality
of Ships 52-58 (1967).
17. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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ish seaman sued a Spanish shipping corporation under both the Jones Act and
the general maritime law for an injury which occurred in New York harbor.
Since the place-of-injury contact had been minimized in Lauritzen, the Court
found that the law of the flag controlled the choice of law and held the Jones
Act inapplicable. However, it further elaborated that the Lauritzen rationale
was not limited solely to suits brought under the Jones Act, but that its prin-
ciples regarding choice of law and jurisdiction would be extended to the general
maritime law-i.e., unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure actions. What
is called for in these cases, the Court stated, is a weighing of those factors of
international law which call for respect of the vessel's flag, against those of
national interest served by the assertion of domestic authority over foreign
defendants.' 8
In cases where an alien seaman brought suit against a United States corpo-
ration or vessel, our courts have found little difficulty in applying the Jones
Act.' 9 However, where the defendant is a foreign steamship corporation, it is
then necessary, if the Jones Act is to apply, to look behind the corporate facade
to determine the true, beneficial ownership of the vessel. The Jones Act has been
applied in several cases where it appeared that the foreign corporation was
owned and controlled by American citizens, and was organized primarily to
circumvent rigid domestic controls, taxes, and high wage costs implicit in United
States registry-the typical flag-of-convenience vessel.20 The flag in order to
control "must not be one of convenience merely but bona fide."2 1 The courts
have, however, become increasingly more liberal as to what constitutes a flag-
of-convenience vessel. They have even termed the flag one of convenience when,
for instance, less than a majority interest in the foreign corporation was held
by American citizens, although the shares owned by the citizens were enough
to permit control.22
18. Id. at 382-83; see 345 U.S. at 584-86.
19. See, e.g., In re Risdal & Anderson, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 353 (D. Mass. 1968).
20. See Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 869 (1961); Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959); Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp.
320 (SD.N.Y. 1962).
21. Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651, 653 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 US. 869 (1961).
22. Id. (20% American control); Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp.
320 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (48ya% American control). However, it should be noted that these
corporations are not eligible for United States registry. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 11, 802 (1964);
19 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.19 (1969). 46 U.S.C.A. § 11 (Supp. 1969) states: "Vessels built within
the United States and belonging wholly to citizens thereof; and vessels which may be cap-
tured in war by citizens of the United States and lawfully condemned as prize, or which may
be adjudged to be forfeited for a breach of the laws of the United States; and seagoing
vessels, whether steam or sail, which have been certified by the Coast Guard as safe to carry
dry and perishable cargo, wherever built, which are to engage only in trade with foreign
countries, with the Islands of Guam, Tutuila, Wake, Midway, and Kingman Reef, being wholly
owned by citizens of the United States or corporations organized and chartered under the
laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, the president and managing directors of
1969]
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The typical flag-of-convenience vessel is one whose ownership and manage-
ment is predominantly exercised by American citizens and thus eligible to
utilize United States registry, but which is registered, or its corporate owner is
organized under a foreign nation's laws to avoid what is considered oppressive
federal regulation, taxes or operating costs.23 The national flags usually utilized
are those of Panama, Liberia, and Honduras2 4 since their regulations, taxes and
wage costs are among the lowest in the world.25 The flags of the Western Euro-
pean nations, including the Greek flag, do not usually provide such incentives
and thus are not considered flags-of-convenience. 20
The court's decision in Rhoditis is at odds with that of the Second Circuit in
Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp.,27 which involved a Jones Act suit
against the same corporate defendant by a Greek alien injured in Brooklyn
harbor. The Tsakonites court expressly found that the defendant's Greek flag
was not a flag-of-convenience. It relied upon the fact that the defendants had
substantial contacts with Greece-4.e., that they incorporated Hellenic Lines in
that country, maintained its largest office there, called there for crews and pro-
visions, that a majority of the officers and directors of the corporation, and all
which shall be citizens of the United States, and no others, may be registered as directed In
this chapter and chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of this title." See also The Tanamo, 83 F.2d 161
(2d Cir. 1936); United States v. The Meacham, 107 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Va. 1952), aff'd, 207
F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 801 (1954). 46 U.S.C.A. § 802(a) (Supp.
1969) states: "Within the meaning of this chapter no corporation, partnership, or association
shall be deemed a citizen of the United States unless the controlling interest therein is owned
by citizens of the United States, and, in the case of a corporation, unless its president and
managing directors are citizens of the United States and the corporation itself is organized
under the laws of the United States or of a State, Territory, District, or Possession thereof,
but in the case of a corporation, association, or partnership operating any vessel In the
coastwise trade the amount of interest required to be owned by citizens of the United States
shall be 75 per centum." By "controlling interest" is meant a 519 share-holding by American
citizens.
23. See B. Boczek, Flags of Convenience 1-90 (1962); H. Meyers, supra note 16, at 57
n.1; Harolds, Some Legal Problems Arising Out of Foreign Flag Operations, 28 Fordham
L. Rev. 295 (1959).
24. See B. Boczek, supra note 23, at 1-90; H. Meyers, supra note 16, at 57 n.1; Harolds,
supra note 23, at 295. Costa Rico was formerly also a favorite. However, with the enactment
of tougher regulations regarding safety and construction of vessels it has lost its role. H.
Meyers, supra note 16, at 57 n.1. For the number of vessels under the PANLIBHON
(Panama, Liberia and Honduras) block, and those under U.S. control see The Runaway-
Flag Threat to the U.S. Merchant Fleet, Seafarers Int'l Union's Position Paper to the
Maritime Advisory Committee (1964); for a favorable appraisal of flags-of-convenience
see Report of the American Committee for Flags of Necessity (1964).
25. See J. Clark, Flags of Whose Convenience, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 50
(Oct., 1968).
26. See Gkiafis v. S.S. Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1967); Tjonaman v. A/S Glittre,
340 F.2d 290 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965) ; Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers
Corp., 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966).
27. 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966).
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its shareholders, were Greek residents or citizens.28 The Second Circuit thus con-
cluded that the defendant-corporations had not simply utilized the Greek
registry to evade United States regulation. On the contrary, the court in Rhoditis
found that the defendants' flag was "more symbolic than real" and that it was
"merely one of convenience." 29
In utilizing the flag-of-convenience test as a factor in finding a counterbalance
to the law of the flag, an increasing number of courts have focused on the for-
eign corporation's domestic economic ties or locus of control. These courts have
stated that "[t]he mode and manner of the business arrangement adopted by
defendants is such a substantial and far-reaching contact with the United States
.. as to reduce other factors to mere formal labels."'30 Thus, if an analysis of
the corporation's base of business operations reveals that it is "substantial"
within the United States, sufficient justification to impose Jones Act liability
upon the foreign corporate defendant arises.3 ' The Supreme Court32 and the
Second Circuit 33 both appear to have repudiated this business control or con-
tact theory, although the Fifth Circuit in the case in point squarely rests its
decision thereon? 4 The economic control doctrine is similar to the "nexus"
theory currently utilized in other areas of the law.35 Generally, a court employ-
ing this rationale analyzes and weighs the significant relationships in the case,
and applies the law of the locality with the most compelling contacts. In a case
such as Rhoditis, this may or may not be the place where the tort occurred. " '
The Rhoditis court found the most significant relationships of the defendant to
be in the United States, thus concluding that the vessel's flag was merely one
of convenience and that the Jones Act was the proper choice of law.37 The court
adopted in toto Circuit Judge Waterman's reasoning in his Tsakonites dissent
that, since resident aliens, as the principal shareholders, are accorded many of
the same rights and privileges as are United States citizens, they and the corpo-
28. Id. at 428.
29. 412 F.2d at 923.
30. Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
31. Compare Garis v. Compania Maritima San Basilio, 386 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967)
with Voyiatzis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
and Firipis v. The S.S. Margaritis, 181 F. Supp. 48 (ED. Va.), afrd sub nom., Southern
Cross S-S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
32. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 US. 10 (1963).
33. Tjonaman v. A/S Glittre, 340 F.2d 290, 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925
(1965). See also Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966).
34. 412 F2d at 926.
35. See, e.g., Humboldt Foods, Inc. v. Massey, 297 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Miss. 1968)
(when a corporation is considered to be doing business within a state); Longines-Vittnauer
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.YS.2d 8, cert. denied,
282 U.S. 905 (1965) (jurisdiction of state court) ; Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (choice of law).
36. Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 393 US. 979
(1968) (airliner crash); McClure v. U.S. Lines Co., 368 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1965) (nexus
theory applied to suit in admiralty).
37. 412 F.2d at 926.
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rations they own should also bear the burdens of the applicable United States
statutes.3 8 The courts in the past have only felt compelled to find Jones Act
liability when the foreign corporation was owned by American citizens and not
resident aliens.3 9 However, the United States does indeed require a resident
alien to comply with our statutes in the conduct of his personal actions, 40 and
in return grants him various constitutional protections.
41
Aside from a finding that a foreign steamship company flies a flag-of-con-
venience, either through citizenship or economic contacts, the courts have also
generally required that the place of the alien seaman's injury be within United
States territorial waters in order to outweigh the law of the flag.42 In both the
Second Circuit's Tsakonites decision and the present case, the injury occurred
within United States waters. Thus, the only explanation for the contrary results
hinges on the courts' differing determinations of what constitutes a flag-of-
convenience, each reached by diverse interpretations of the business or economic
control criteria.
The tendency of United States courts to disregard the law of the flag, espe-
cially in flag-of-convenience situations, has been the subject of severe criticism,la
especially after the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
adopted the Convention on the High Seas44 to which the United States is a
signatory. The imposition of Jones Act liability against a foreign steamship
corporation requires a careful analysis and interpretation of the Jones Act by
the courts. 45 Imposing liability upon flag-of-convenience vessels operated by
38. 368 F.2d at 430; 412 F.2d at 925.
39. Brillis v. Chandris (U.S.A.) Inc., 215 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Voyiatzis V.
National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also 2 M.
Norris, The Law of Seamen § 681, at 841-42 (2d ed. 1962); Note, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 237,
238 (1953); Note, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1400, 1408 (1961).
40. See, e.g., Leonhard v. Eley, 151 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1945) (requiring aliens to
serve in our armed forces).
41. See, e.g., Kwong Ha Chen v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
42. Compare Malanos v. Marsuerte Compania Naviera, SA., 259 F. Supp. 646 (ED.
Va. 1966) with Kontos v. S.S. Sophie C., 236 F. Supp. 664 (ED. Pa. 1964) and Filippou
v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navizione, 254 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1966).
43. See, e.g., H. Meyers, supra note 16, at 56.
44. Convention on the High Seas, Sept. 15, 1962, [1962) 2 U.S.T. 2315, T.I.A.S. No.
5200. The Convention attempted to deal with the flag-of-convenience problem by requiring
that there exist a "genuine link" between the vessel and the flag states. Id. art. 5. See M.
Sorenson, Law of the Sea 201 (1958) (reprinted in International Conciliation, Nov. 1958).
However the precise meaning of a "genuine link" was never defined, and thus the problem of
flag-of-convenience vessels was ineffectively dealt with by the Convention. Furthermore,
the convention provided that the law of the flag was to be disregarded only in exceptional
cases. [19621 2 U.S.T. 2315, T.IA.S. No. 5200, art. 6.
45. Some jurists and commentators have found an expression of congressional intent
in the wording of the Jones Act that "[any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment." 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). See 358 U.S. at 389 (Black, J. dissent-
ing); H. Baer, supra note 5, at 59-60; Harolds, supra note 23, at 305. Legislative history
pertaining to this section of the Jones Act is non-existent. However, the Supreme Court
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American citizens is clearly justified since they have attempted to evade United
States regulation.46 However, when the foreign corporation is not controlled by
American citizens, application of the Rhoditis rationale subjecting the defen-
dant to Jones Act liability may be an unwarranted disregard of the law of the
flag. The fact that corporations controlled by resident aliens will be subjected
to the same Jones Act liabilities as domestic corporations removes one of the
many advantages of registering a vessel under a foreign flag. This may cause
such corporations to transfer their base of operations from the United States.
However, the existing conflict between Rhoditis and Tsakonites makes it evi-
dent that a more clearly detailed set of guidelines in the area of flag-of-con-
venience vessels is obviously needed.
Conflict of Laws-Torts-Death of DYM; Governmental Interest Theory
Reaffirmed. -Decedent, a New York domiciliary, was a student resident at
Michigan State University. While a passenger in a car driven by a classmate,
Marcia Lopez, the decedent was killed after the driver lost control of the
vehicle while attempting to pass another car. The accident also seriously in-
jured another passenger, Susan Silk, a Michigan domiciliary. The automobile
which Miss Lopez was driving belonged to her father who resided in New
York where the car was registered and insured. Decedent's father commenced
a wrongful death action against the owner of the vehicle in New York. Defen-
dant asserted as an affirmative defense the Michigan guest statute' which
permits recovery by guests only by a showing of willful misconduct or gross
negligence of the driver. The trial court dismissed the affirmative defense,2 but
the appellate division reversed,3 stating that it was "constrained" by the
holding in Dym v. Gordon.4 The New York Court of Appeals reversed the
appellate division, thereby casting serious doubt upon the further validity of
Dyrn. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519
(1969).
Prior to Tooker New York law was in a state of flux5 with respect to tort
actions involving a conflict of state laws. The seeds of this confusion were
noted in Lauritzen that the phrase should not be construed so broadly. 345 US. at 592-93.
See also McCulloch v. Sodedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
46. See Harold, supra note 23, where the author advocates an even stronger disregard
of the law of the flag which he believes will tend to equalize foreign shipping competition
with that of the United States.
1. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.401 (1967).
2. The trial judge concluded that: "New York State 'has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation' and that New York law should apply." 24 N.Y.2d 569,
571, 249 N.E.2d 394, 395, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 521 (1969).
3. 30 App. Div. 2d 115, 290 N.Y.S.2d 762 (3d Dep't 1968).
4. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
5. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 15, 237 N.E.2d 877, 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (1968).
See also Currie, Comments On Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 551, 595-98 (1968).
19691
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first sown by the contradictions apparent in the now famous trilogy of tort
conflict cases-Babcock v. Jackson,0 Dym v. Gordon,7 and Macey v. Rozbicki.8
In Babcock, the plaintiff-guest was injured during a weekend trip to Canada
when the defendant's vehicle swerved off the highway and crashed into a stone
wall. In a New York action, defendant raised as a defense Ontario's guest
statute9 barring recovery. At the time of the accident, both plaintiff and defen-
dant were New York domiciliaries and the vehicle was registered and insured
in New York. The court rejected Ontario's guest statute, and applied New
York law, noting that it was not prejudicing Ontario's interest since the pur-
pose of the Ontario statute was merely to protect its own insurance companies
against fraud. 10 The court also carefully pointed out that the statute was not
concerned with the manner in which the driver operated the vehicle." Pre-
sumably, had this been the concern of the statute, Ontario's interest would
have been paramount and its own law applied. 12
Thus, in Babcock, the strict lex locus delicti doctrine13 was replaced 14 by
the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts"'Ir test, previously formulated
and introduced into contract law in Auten v. Auten.16 In describing the guide-
lines for the application of this test to tort actions, the court stated that
controlling effect should be given to "the law of the jurisdiction which, because
6. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
7. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
8. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
9. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960). This statute acted as an absolute bar to
recovery and provided that "the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle
operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss
or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in ...
the motor vehicle." Id.
10. 12 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. The Babcock court
went on to state that "[wlhether New York defendants are imposed upon or their insurers
defrauded by a New York plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative concern of Ontario simply
because the accident occurred there, any more so than if the accident had happened in some
other jurisdiction." Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. According to the lex locus delicti or "vested rights" doctrine the liabilities arising
out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by the law of the place of the tort. See Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws § 384 (1934); H. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 260 (3d ed.
1949).
14. See generally Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar & Reese, Comments On
Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development In Conflict Of Laws, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212
(1963).
15. 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749. The phrases "center of
gravity" and "grouping of contacts", however, were not universally accepted. See Babcock
v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d at 486, 191 N.E.2d at 286, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 753 (Van Voorhis, J., dis-
senting) and Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d at 135, 209 N.E.2d at 801, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 475
(Desmond, C.J., dissenting).
16. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E2d 99 (1954).
of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has the great-
est concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation."' 7
With the end of the lex locus delicti theory two distinct philosophies devel-
oped within the New York courts as to the meaning and application of the
Babcock doctrine.1 s Under the "mechanical contacts" approach, the courts
applied the law of the state having the most significant or numerous contacts
with the matter in dispute, often without any discussion of the relevant policy
considerations involved. On the other hand, the "public policy" or "govern-
mental interest" approach rejected a strict adherence to such a mechanical for-
mula. Instead, it looked to the interests of the respective states in determining
which state law should be applied.
The confusing effects of this dichotomy in legal reasoning were first dearly
evidenced in Dyrn v. Gordon.19 In Dyrn, the plaintiff and defendant, both
New York domiciliaries, traveled separately to Colorado to attend a college
summer session. There, plaintiff was injured while a passenger in a car owned
and negligently driven by the defendant.2 0 At the time of this accident, a
Colorado statute21 barred an action against a host for ordinary vehicular
negligence.22 The New York court focused its attention upon the fact that
the parties were dwelling in Colorado when the relationship was formed and also
upon the fact that the accident arose out of a Colorado based activity.m It
went on to distinguish Babcock by noting that, in addition to protecting
local insurance carriers against fraud, the Colorado guest statute had as its
purpose the preservation of the defendant's assets for the benefit of non-neg-
ligently injured parties in other vehicles.2 4 Based upon these factors, the court
concluded that since Colorado had the most significant contacts with the "rela-
tionship itself and the basis of its formation," the application of its law was
clearly warranted. 25
Although Dym was decided by New York's highest court, the validity of
its reasoning was considered in a number of subsequent New York cases begin-
ing with Long v. Pan American World Airways,20 an action for wrongful
17. 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
18. Baer, Two Approaches To Guest Statutes In The Conflict Of Laws: Mechanical
Jurisprudence Versus Groping For Contacts, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 537, 565-66 (1967).
19. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
20. The other vehicle in the accident was operated by a Kansas driver and was registered
in Kansas. 16 N.Y.2d at 130, 209 N.E.2d at 798, 262 N.YS.2d at 471 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
21. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-9-1 (1963).
22. In contrast to the Babcock statute which acted as an absolute bar to recovery, this
statute was less severe in that it allowed a guest to recover upon a showing of gross
negligence. See 16 N.Y.2d at 122, 209 N.E.2d at 793, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
23. Numerous New York contacts were also considered by the court but were rejected
as an attempt "to use a quantitative rather than a qualitative test . . . [which] tends to
distort Babcock into a rule of domicile or one directed toward public policy." 16 N.Y2d
at 124, 209 N.E2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
26. 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
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death 27 resulting from an airplane crash in Maryland. The court, relying on
Pennsylvania's more numerous contacts, 28 held the law of Pennsylvania ap-
plicable rather than that of Maryland. 29 However, the court also stated that
had Maryland demonstrated some public policy which needed protection, it
would have considered applying her law, even though Maryland was only
"fortuitously the situs of the accident." 30 Thus, the court, talking in terms of
both contacts and interests, did little to clarify the confusion engendered by
Dym.
The reasoning of Dym, however, was shortly to be challenged by Judge
Keating in his concurring opinion in Macey v. Rozbicki.31 Here the plaintiff,
a New York resident, was visiting her sister and brother-in-law, also New
York residents, at their summer home in Ontario. While in Ontario, the plain-
tiff was injured while a passenger in the defendant's motor vehicle. The New
York court held the Ontario guest statute,3 2 which barred actions by a guest-
passenger, inapplicable and allowed the plaintiff to recover.3 3 Although the
majority opinion, written by Judge Fuld, did not discuss New York's public
policy in relation to guest statutes, 34 Judge Keating, concurring, stated that
the facts of the case could properly be considered only in the light of "relevant
policy considerations. '35 Of special concern to Judge Keating was New York's
strong public policy of indemnifying the victims of negligent drivers.30 Noting
the irreconcilability of the Dym and Babcock decisions, Judge Keating con-
cluded that the court should no longer follow the decision of Dym v. Gordon.37
27. The court applied the Babcock ruling to the wrongful death action stating that "[i)t
would be highly incongruous and unreal to have the flexible principle of Babcock apply in
a case where the victim of the tort is injured but not where he is killed." Id. at 343, 213
N.E.2d at 799, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 518. A number of other cases relied on by the court had
also previously indicated an expansion of the Babcock doctrine. See, e.g., Griffith v. United
Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
28. The defendant was a common carrier doing business in Pennsylvania; the accident
occurred in the course of that business; plaintiffs purchased their round-trip tickets in
Pennsylvania; and the flight was to begin and terminate in Pennsylvania. The only Mary-
land contact was the fact that the plane fell on Maryland territory following a mid-air
explosion.
29. 16 N.Y.2d at 343, 213 N.E.2d at 799, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
30. Id. at 342, 213 N.E.2d at 798, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
31. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
32. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
33. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591. In this case all the contacts were
New York related except that the particular trip was between two points in Canada. This
factor, however, was termed insignificant by the court. Id. at 292, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274
N.Y.S.2d at 593.
34. Judge Fuld had previously considered the public policy argument in relation to
guest statutes in Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d at 129, 209 N.E.2d at 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d at
470 (dissenting opinion).
35. 18 N.Y.2d at 296, 221 NXE.2d at 384, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 597. See Currie, Comments
On Babcock v. Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212, 1235 (1963).
36. 18 N.Y.2d at 293, 221 N.E.2d at 382, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
37. Id. at 298, 221 N.E.2d at 385, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
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Following its decision in Macey, the court had an opportunity to reconsider
the public policy argument in two non-tort cases&$-In re Crichtoip9 and In
re Clark.40 In Crichton, a New York domiciliary died leaving considerable as-
sets in Louisiana. Under Louisiana law41 the wife was entitled to one-half of
the estate, while under New York law42 she was entitled to one-third. In reach-
ing its decision to apply New York law, the court rejected a quantitive grouping
of contacts, 4 3 giving as its reason the fact that "Louisiana has no such interest
in protecting and regulating the rights of married persons residing and domi-
ciled in New York."44 In Clark, the decedent, a domiciliary of Virginia, died
leaving his estate to his widow, also a Virginia domiciliary. The decedent's
will contained a provision that "this Will and the testamentary dispositions
in it and the trusts set up shall be construed, regulated and determined by
the laws of the State of New York.' ",, Under the terms of the will a marital
deduction trust was created for the benefit of the widow under which she
would receive the income for life, with a general testamentary power of appoint-
ment over the principal of the trust.40 In contrast, under Virginia law,4 7 the
widow had the unconditional right to renounce her husband's will and take
her intestate share of the will outright. 48 Thus the issue dearly framed for the
court was whether the provision in the decedent's will that it "and the testa-
mentary dispositions in it" be determined by New York law could deprive
the widow, a Virginia resident, of the more favorable right of election given
her by the law of Virginia, her domicile. The court, following the reasoning
of Crichton, held that it could not and declared that where a state has the
predominant interest in upholding the rights of the parties, the law of that
state should be applied.49 Here "Virginia's overwhelming interest in the pro-
tection of surviving spouses domiciled there" °50 dictated the application of
her law.
38. These cases are concerned with wills and estates. Nevertheless, their analysis of the
conflict of laws problems involved are also relevant to tort law since their holdings have
been used as a basis for subsequent tort conflict decisions. See, eg., Miller v. Miller, 22
N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
39. 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
40. 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
41. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2406 (West 1952).
42. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 18 (1949).
43. Under a quantitative "grouping of contacts" theory the courts place the main em-
phasis on the law of the place "which has the most significant contacts with the matter in
dispute." Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305, 113 N.E.2d 424, 431 (1953). See
also Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954); Jones v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 469-70, 286 N.Y.S. 4, 8 (Sup. CL 1936).
44. 20 N.Y.2d at 134, 228 N.E.2d at 806, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
45. 21 N.Y.2d at 481, 236 N.E.2d at 153, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
46. Id.
47. Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-16 (1950).
48. The Virginia law would allow the widow, in the absence of issue, to take one-half
of her deceased husband's estate outright.
49. 21 N.Y2d at 486, 236 N.E.2d at 156, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 998-99.
50. Id. at 489, 236 N.E.2d at 158, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
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Miller v. Miller,51 a wrongful death action, was the most recent New York
Court of Appeals decision preceding Tooker. Here the decedent, a New York
resident, was killed while on a trip to Maine when a vehicle driven by his
brother, a Maine resident, crashed into a bridge railing. In the ensuing action,
defendant's brother asserted as a partial defense the $30,000 limitation on re-
coveries in effect in Maine at the time of decedent's death.5 2 The New York
Court of Appeals held the Maine limitation inapplicable in New York, 3 even
though the accident took place in Maine where the defendants then resided.
The court attempted to resolve the prior Dym inconsistancy by reaffirming
its rejection of a purely mechanical "grouping of contacts" theory in conflict
of law cases.54 More significantly, the court stated that it must look to the
interests of the respective states as they relate to the purpose of a particular
statute to determine which state's law should apply.5
Tooker presented the Court of Appeals with an excellent opportunity to
reevaluate its prior holdings5 6 in the light of some of these more recent deci-
sions. In Babcock the court looked to the purpose of the Ontario guest stat-
ute and decided that New York had the sole interest to protect. Therefore, it
applied her law.5 7 Dym presented a situation similar to Babcock, except that
Dym involved a two car collision and an injured non-guest third party. Again
the court looked to the purpose of Colorado's guest statute and determined
that Colorado, unlike Ontario in Babcock, had the sufficient interest to pro-
tect, namely, the preservation of defendant's assets for the benefit of the
injured third party.58 It should be noted, however, that the injured third party
was not a resident of Colorado, but of Kansas.59 Therefore, the governmental
interest theory was again brought into dispute. In Macey, the court merely
avoided this controversy by couching its language in terms of contacts,00 a
theory subsequently rejected by other court decisions.0 ' Thus the issue clearly
51. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
52. The $30,000 limitation has since been repealed. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 2552
(1964), as amended, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. it. 18, § 2552 (1967).
53. 22 N.Y.2d at 19, 237 N.E.2d at 881, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
54. Id. at 17, 237 N.E.2d at 880, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
55. Id. at 15-16, 237 N.E.2d at 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 737. See also 43 St. John's L. Rev.
277 (1968).
56. At the outset of the majority opinion Judge Keating noted that Tooker "gives us
the opportunity to resolve those inconsistencies in a class of cases which have been par-
ticularly troublesome." 24 N.Y.2d at 572, 249 N.E.2d at 395, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
57. 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
58. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-9-1 (1963).
59. 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
60. After considering the contacts of the respective states, the Macey court concluded
that "[e]very fact in this case was New York related, save only the not particularly sig-
nificant one that the particular trip on the day of the accident was between two points in
Canada." 18 N.Y.2d at 292, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593. Thus, as judge Keating
noted in Tooker, the Macey court, ignoring the rationale of both Babcock and Dym, bad
reached the right decision but for the wrong reasons. 24 N.Y.2d at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 398,
301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
61. Id. at 576, 249 N.E,2d at 398, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524-25.
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raised by Tooker was whether the state in which an auto accident occurs has
any interest in applying its law where both parties to the dispute are domi-
ciliaries of the forum state and the car is registered and insured in that state.
At the outset of its opinion, the court dearly distinguished Tooker from the
facts in Dym.62 In Tooker there was no non-guest injured third party and
consequently no need to protect the defendant's assets from dissolution. How-
ever, the court found itself unable to place reliance on this difference when
faced with its previous holding in Macey, where it refused to apply the Ontario
guest statute on facts almost indistinguishable from Dym. 63 Thus the court
was compelled to evaluate the interests of the respective states in the light of
the interest test originally set forth in Babcock.
Colorado's interest in Dyrn was found to be the preservation of the defen-
dant's assets for the benefit of injured non-guest third parties. The majority
in Tooker, however, held that the construction placed on the Colorado stat-
ute in Dym was dearly mistaken," and that even had its sole purpose been
to protect local insurance carriers against fraud such a purpose could "never
be vindicated when the insurer is a New York carrier and the defendant is
sued in the courts of this State."'6 5 Under these circumstances, "the juris-
diction enacting such a guest statute has absolutely no interest in the appli-
cation of its law."66 New York's interest, however, can be found in its strong
policy of indemnifying the innocent victims of automobile accidents regardless
of any potential collusion between a guest-plaintiff and a host-defendant. 7
The court thus seemed to be establishing the rule that in order for New York
to consider the interests of the situs state, at least one of the parties to the
action must be a domiciliary of that state or the car must be registered or
insured in that state.
Such a conclusion, however, must be considered in light of Kell v. Hender-
son,6 s an earlier appellate division case whose facts are almost directly con-
62. Id. at 574, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 523-24.
65. Id. at 575, 249 N.E2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
66. Id. This same reasoning was employed by a lower New York court in Du Bois v.
Siewert, 57 Misc. 2d 881, 293 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. CL 1968). Here the court held that New
York law would be applied to an Ohio automobile accident where the parties were domi-
ciliaries and permanent residents of New York and the automobile was registered and in-
sured in New York. The court held that Ohio's connection with the action from a public
policy point of view was nothing more than fortuitous, and that none of its social purposes
would be served by applying its guest statute.
67. New York's strong public policy of indemnifying the victims of automobile accidents
is clearly set forth in its preface to New York's compulsory insurance law: "The legislature
is concerned over the rising toll of motor vehicle accidents and the suffering and loss thereby
inflicted. The legislature determines that it is a matter of grave concern that motorists
shall be financially able to respond in damages for their negligent acts, so that innocent
victims of motor vehicle accidents may be recompensed for the injury and financial loss
inflicted upon them." N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 310 (1960).
68. 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270
N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966).
19691 CASE NOTES
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
verse to those of Tooker. There the plaintiff brought an action in New York
as a result of injuries sustained in a one car accident on a New York highway.
All the parties involved in the accident were residents of Ontario, Canada. The
automobile was registered and insured in Canada where the trip originated and
was to terminate. The defendant raised as a defense the Ontario guest statute9
which bars a negligence action brought by a nonpaying passenger against the
owner or operator of a motor vehicle. The court, relying on the Vehicle and Traf-
fic Law7" of New York which establishes liability for any motor vehicle using the
highways of New York, held that the owner could not plead the Ontario statute
as a defense.71 At first glance it might appear that, based upon Tooker, such
a set of facts would dictate the opposite result. However, the court's decision
can easily be justified by examining the purposes sought to be served by the
statutes in conflict and relating them to the issue in dispute.72 The purpose
of the Ontario statute was to deprive gratuitous passengers from recovering
damages in automobile accidents due to the negligence of the driver.73 The pur-
pose of New York's traffic law, on the other hand, was to insure safe conduct
on its highways. 74 Since the issue herein involved was whether New York has
the right to regulate the conduct of drivers within her borders, the court applied,
New York's law while rejecting the guest statute of Ontario.75
Judge Breitel, in his dissenting opinion in Tooker, disagreed with the major-
ity's application of New York law and raised the objection that the factors
considered determinative by the majority were merely "adventitious" so far
as the trip was concerned.70 He maintained that the fact that the parties were
New York domiciliaries and the car was registered and insured in New York
in no way affected the conduct of the parties and, therefore, could not be de-
terminative of the result reached in this case.77 Using an analogy to Babcock
69. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
70. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388 (1960), as amended, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388
(1962).
71. 47 Misc. 2d at 995, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
72. This is the same test as was set forth in Miller, 22 N.Y.2d at 15-16, 237 N.E.2d at
879, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
73. See Baade, Counter-Revolution Or Alliance For Progress? Reflections On Reading
Cavers, The Choice-Of-Law Process, 46 Tex. L. Rev. 141, 172 (1967).
74. See note 67 supra.
75. This conclusion was also reached in Babcock when it stated that "[w]here the
defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his automobile is in issue, the jurisdiction
in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually have a predominant, if not
exclusive, concern." 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. Such a
conclusion, however, may still be open to question. Although the courts have avoided a
discussion of owner liability versus guest statutes, a possible argument could be made that
in a case such as Kell the statutes would not be in conflict. Under this reasoning New York
would have the right to impose liability upon the owner according to its Vehicle and Traffic
Law, but since the accident involved solely Ontario residents, the Ontario guest statute
should be admitted as a defense to protect the Ontario insurance companies against collusion
and fraud.
76. 24 N.Y.2d at 593, 249 N.E.2d at 409, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40 (dissenting opinion).
77. Id. at 593-94, 249 N.E.2d at 409, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 540 (dissenting opinion).
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and Macey, where the situs of the accident was "wholly adventitious to the
relationship or status among the parties," Judge Breitel concluded that the
converse-the incidental domicile of the parties and the incidental registration
and insurance of the car-should likewise be disregarded as adventitious. 78
However, such an argument, as pointed out by the majority, must dearly be
rejected for it can be shown by reductio ad absurdun that almost every fact
in the case could be considered "adventitious" 70 resulting in an incomprehen-
sible choice of laws problem.
The much more difficult question of the status of Miss Silk, alluded to by the
dissent, 0 is however, not so readily capable of solution. The majority stressed
the concern which the New York State Legislature has demonstrated by
requiring that insurance policies cover liability for injuries regardless of where
the accident takes place.81 Yet the possibility that Miss Silk might still be
denied recovery8 2 did not deter the court from reaching its decision. The fact
that there may be innocent third parties who may be denied recovery would
not affect the result, such a denial being merely "'the implicit consequence'
of a Federal system which .... does not arise from any choice-of-law rule.'"3
Such an answer, however, does not go to a solution of the problem. Perhaps,
as indicated by Judge Burke, the court is not yet prepared to consider this
question8 4 and has chosen instead to await the further development of this
particular area of the law.
Despite these shortcomings, Tooker stands as a significant turning point in
the realm of conflict of laws. With its decision, New York has firmly com-
mitted itself to the interest analysis approach of Babcock while finally elim-
inating many of the confusions and doubts so long cast by its holding in
Dym.s5 But, like so many other cases, by resolving one problem the door is
now open to many other problems. Perhaps Judge Burke was correct in en-
visioning that the very nature of automotive traffic today and the innumerable
factual situations which can arise establishes the entire matter as one of
"national concern which cannot be settled by any rule this court might
proffer." 881 However, unless and until such a supervening federal answer should
78. Id.
79. The majority points out that Miss Tooker's "decision to go to Michigan State Uni-
versity as opposed to New York University" as well as "her decision to go to Detroit on
the weekend in question instead of staying on campus and studying may equally have been
'adventitious.'" 24 N.Y.2d at 578, 249 N.E.2d at 399-400, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
80. Id. at 597, 249 N.E.2d at 411, 301 N.YS.2d at 543 (dissenting opinion).
81. Id. at 577, 249 N.E2d at 398-99, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525-26.
82. This distinct possibility, although minimized by the majority, is dearly posed as a
serious problem in both Judge Burke's concurring and Judge Breitel's dissenting opinions.
Id. at 591, 597, 249 N.E.2d at 408, 411, 301 N.YS.2d at 538, 543.
83. Id. at 580, 249 N.E2d at 400, 301 N.YS.2d at 528.
84. Id. at 591-92, 249 N.E.2d at 408, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 538-39 (concurring opinion).
85. The court's evident disapproval of Dym is further supported by the concurring
opinion of judge Burke who had written the majority opinion in Dym. Judge Burke states
that "[flrom all that has been written, it is apparent that our decision in Dym is overruled."
24 N.Y.2d at 591, 249 N.E2d at 407, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 538 (concurring opinion).
86. 24 N.Y.2d at 592, 249 N.E2d at 408, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 538 (concurring opinion).
19691 CASE NTOTES
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
arise, the state courts must continue to fulfill their obligation of deciding tort
conflict cases under the more illuminating light of Tooker.
Criminal Procedure--Confessions-Doctrine of Jackson v. Denno Held
Inapplicable in a Nonjury Trial.-Following a nonjury trial,' at which his
confession was admitted in evidence, petitioner was convicted of manslaughter
in the second degree.2 The conviction was not appealed. Subsequently, Jackson
v. Denno3 was decided, and thereafter petitioner filed an application for a
writ of error coram nobis,4 arguing that his conviction should be set aside
because his contested confession had not received a separate hearing on the
issue of voluntariness as allegedly required by Jackson. The court denied
relief and its decision was affirmed, without opinion, by the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court.5 The New York Court of Appeals, in affirming the
appellate division judgment, ruled that the Jackson doctrine concerns con-
tested confessions in cases tried before a judge and jury only and is not
applicable in nonjury trials. Thus, a separate hearing in a nonjury trial on the
issue of the voluntariness of a contested confession is not required. People v.
Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168, 247 N.E.2d 153, 299 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1969).
In 1953, the Supreme Court, in Stein v. New York,0 upheld the old New
York procedure for determining the voluntariness of a confession. This pro-
cedure required that the trial judge exclude a contested confession only if
there were no conflict in the evidence and, as a matter of law, the confession
were found to be involuntary. 7 The jury was not required to be absent while
1. Petitioner waived the right to trial by jury. Record, People v. Brown, No. 571-63
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Nov. 4, 1963).
2. Ch. 88, art. 94, § 1052, [19091 N.Y. Laws 137th Sess. 141, published as ch. 40, art.
94, § 1052, [19091 Consol. Laws of N.Y. 2681 (repealed 1965) (now N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15
(1967)).
3. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
4. "[Aln emergency measure enabling a defendant to avoid the effects of a conviction
procured by fraud or in violation of his constitutional rights when all other avenues of
judicial relief are closed to him." Fuld, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 117 N.Y.L.J.
2212, 2248 (1947) (emphasis deleted). In People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d
179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965) the New York Court of Appeals ruled that: "[Flor the
future we deem it preferable and hereby direct that in all cases heretofore tried and con-
cluded and in which confessions were introduced and their voluntariness contested, and the
normal appellate processes have been exhausted or are no longer available, defendants seek
Jackson-Denno relief by coram nobis motion. While this is a departure from the tradi-
tional role played by coram nobis we deem its use in these cases appropriate since its em-
ployment will avoid burdening this court and the Appellate Division, as well as other
appellate courts, with rearguments which do no more than withhold determination of such
appeals pending remission to the trial court for the required hearing on the issue of volun-
tariness." Id. at 77, 204 N.E.2d at 182-83, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 842-43.
5. 29 App. Div. 2d 919, 289 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1st Dep't 1968) (mem.).
6. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
7. Id. at 172; see People v. Weiner, 248 N.Y. 118, 122, 161 N.E. 441, 443 (1928).
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the judge heard evidence on this issue.8 If there were a question of fact, the
issue of voluntariness was presented to the jury at the close of the case along
with the determination of guilt or innocence with the direction that they should
reject the confession if "upon the whole evidence" they determined it to be
involuntary.9
Eleven years later, the Supreme Court in Jackson overruled Stein and
held the New York procedure unconstitutional.10 The Court ruled that the
procedure violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by
failing to give a defendant a "fair hearing and a reliable determination on the
issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of
the confession."' In analysing the procedure the Court found it constitutionally
deficient since "the evidence given the jury inevitably injects irrelevant and
impermissible considerations of truthfulness of the confession into the assess-
ment of voluntariness.11 2 Reasoning that a jury may find it "difficult" to
appreciate the policy of excluding an involuntary confession, even though it
may be truthful, the Court concluded that such a policy creates a "potent
pressure" which makes objective consideration of the separate issues of vol-
untariness and guilt difficult since considerations of guilt might easily infect
the determination of voluntariness.' 3
Thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Huntley14 adopted
8. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 172 (1953); accord, People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46,
54, 85 N.E. 809, 812 (1908). See also People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 159, 87 N.E. 112,
116-17 (1909) (dictum that the jury must actually be present during the taking of such evi-
dence by the judge).
9. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 172 (1953); People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 416-17,
159 NX.. 379, 381-82 (1927).
10. Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin
and Wyoming had employed similar procedures and were therefore directly affected by
this decision. 378 U.S. at 414-17 (App. A to Black, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 377. In Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), the Court had held that
a determination of voluntariness must be made without consideration of the truthfulness of
the confession. Id. at 543-44. In expressing the principle underlying this decision, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said: "Our decisions under that Amendment [referring to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment] have made clear that convictions following
the admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coer-
don, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions
are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence inde-
pendently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused
out of his own mouth." Id. at 540-41.
12. 378 U.S. at 386.
13. Id. at 382-83. The Court also faulted the absence under the New York system of an
explicit record of the findings upon the various issues, since the jury returned only a
general verdict on the question of guilt or innocence. Id. at 379-80.
14. 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
CASE NOTES1969]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the so-called "Massachusetts" or "humane" rule.r This procedure required
the trial judge to make an independent determination on the issue of volun-
tariness prior to the trial. If the confession were found to be involuntary, it
was excluded. Only if the judge determined the confession to be voluntary
beyond a reasonable doubt 16 was it to be admitted at the trial. The defendant
was then permitted to challenge the confession before the jury which could,
despite the judge's prior determination, find the confession involuntary and
reject it.17
Jackson, however, left unanswered the specific question of what procedure
would be constitutionally acceptable for determining the voluntariness of con-
fessions in nonjury trials. Four other courts18 have dealt with this problem in
the light of Jackson, and all have arrived at conclusions contrary to that reached
by the New York Court of Appeals in Brown. Each court concluded that Jack-
son requires a separate hearing on the issue of voluntariness in a nonjury trial.
One court, in fact, ruled that Jackson not only mandates a separate hearing
but that the hearing must be conducted by a judge other than the trial judge.19
These courts have held that the simultaneous consideration of the issues of
voluntariness and of guilt by the fact-finding body violates the principle es-
tablished in Jackson.20 That the fact-finder is a judge rather than a jury has
been deemed "a distinction without a difference." 21 These courts have similarly
concluded that a judge who has heard evidence of guilt cannot objectively
and reliably determine the voluntariness of a confession as an issue distinct
15. See Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277, 5 N.E. 494, 495 (1885). The
Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 n.8 (1964) indicated that the
Massachusetts rule "does not, in our opinion, pose hazards to the rights of a defendant."
The Court also indicated approval of the "orthodox" procedure in which the judge's
pretrial determination of the issue of voluntariness is final and the jury is not permitted
to reexamine the issue. See 3 3. Wig-more, Evidence § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
16. The Jackson Court left in doubt whether the determination of voluntariness must
be "beyond a reasonable doubt" or merely "on a preponderance of the evidence." See 378
U.S. at 404-05 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
17. 15 N.Y.2d at 78, 204 N.E.2d at 183, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (1965).
18. Hutcherson v. United States, 351 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States ex rel.
Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691 (ED. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969).
United States ex rel. Owens v. Cavell, 254 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Pa. 1966); Commonwealth
v. Patterson, 432 Pa. 76, 247 A.2d 218 (1968).
19. United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691 (ED. Pa. 1967) aff'd, 405
F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969). However, in Commonwealth v. Patterson, 432 Pa. 76, 247 A.2d
218 (1968) the court said: "I am not at all certain that Spears, in interpreting Jackson,
did not go too far in equating judge with jury by holding that Jackson v. Denno requires
a separate judge to hear the question of voluntariness in every case. The minimum required,
however, is that the trial judge rule on voluntariness before hearing the contents of the
confession . . . " Id. at 88, 247 A.2d at 224 (emphasis and footnote deleted).
20. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 695 (ED. Pa.
1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969).
21. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 432 Pa. 76, 86, 247 A.2d 218, 223 (1968).
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from its truthfulness..2 2 Under such circumstances "[objectivity cannot be
guaranteed, and reliability must be questioned."23 This reasoning represents a
broad interpretation of Jackson, based on the premise that a judge is not en-
tirely immune from the wrongful influences of evidence of the truthfulness of
a contested confession. A judge, therefore, like a jury (although perhaps not
to the same degree) ,24 may have difficulty in rejecting an involuntary con-
fession where he has heard evidence that shows the confession to be truthful.2
In Brown the New York Court of Appeals has given Jackson a narrow con-
struction.2 6 In analysing Jackson, it concluded that the Supreme Court based
its decision upon a distrust of the ability of juries to understand and apply
the legal intricacies involved in the separate issues of the voluntariness of a
confession and the guilt of the accused.2 7 The opinion distinguished judge
from jury by stating that: "[A] Judge-unlike a jury-by reason of his
learning, experience and judicial discipline, is uniquely capable of distinguish-
ing the issues and of making an objective determination as to voluntariness,
regardless of whether he has heard evidence on other issues in the case."28 The
court continued: "While a jury may sometimes be confused by the legal in-
tricacies of deciding two questions together, a Judge will not be so disorien-
ted." 2- Taking this position, the case rejected not only the assertion that in a
nonjury case Jackson requires a judge other than the trial judge to hear the
issue of voluntariness in a separate pretrial hearing, but also rejected the
argument of the petitioner that: "[AlIthough the same Judge who tries the
case can determine the issue of voluntariness, that determination should be
made in a separate hearing before the commencement of the trial proper.)uo
The court recognized the existence of authority to the contrary in other juris-
dictions, but such authority was rejected as representing too broad an inter-
pretation of Jackson.31 The reasoning of Brown focuses upon the education
and judicial experience of a judge, terming this "a critical difference between
a jury and nonjury trial."32 In support of its conclusion, the court noted that
in other areas of the law, both civil and criminal, judges who must eventually
determine the ultimate issues regularly rule on the admissibility of evidence. 3
The court also pointed out that it frequently reverses convictions after an
22. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 695 (ED. Pa.
1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969).
23. Id. at 695.
24. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 432 Pa. 76, 88, 247 A.2d 218, 224 (1968).
25. See cases cited note 18 supra.
26. 24 N.Y2d at 172, 247 N.E.2d at 155, 299 N.Y.S2d at 193.
27. Id. at 171, 247 N.E2d at 155, 299 N.YS.2d at 192.
28. Id. at 172, 247 NYE.2d at 155, 299 N.YS.2d at 193.
29. Id. at 172, 247 N.E.2d at 156, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
30. Id. at 171, 247 NE.2d at 155, 299 N.Y.S2d at 192.
31. Id. at 172, 247 N.E2d at 155, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
32. Id. at 173, 247 N.E2d at 156, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
33. Id. at 172-73, 247 N.E.2d at 156, 299 N.Y.S2d at 193-94.
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objective consideration of questions of law, even though convinced by the
entire record of the defendant's guilt.84 As additional support for its conclusion,
the court offered its opinion in People v. Sykesas where it had noted that: "[A]
completely separate hearing on voluntariness may perhaps not be required in
nonjury cases (cf. Code Crim. Pro., § 813-d, subd. 3) .... "30 The section of
the N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure cited in Sykes provides that in the case
of misdemeanors and violations a determination on a motion to suppress ev-
idence obtained as the result of an alleged illegal search and seizure may be
made by the trial judge during the course of the trial.3 7
There appear to be some shortcomings in the reasoning of Brown which
render the opinion susceptible to criticism. A proper analysis of the issues
must include consideration of several factors omitted by the court in its
reasoning. In basing its opinion upon what it considered to be the superior
abilities of a judge,3 8 the Brown court neglected to deal with the legitimate
34. Id. at 173, 247 N.E2d at 156, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
35. 22 N.Y.2d 159, 239 N.E.2d 182, 292 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1968).
36. Id. at 163, 239 N.E.2d at 184, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 79-80; see People v. Brown, 24 N.Y.2d
168, 172-73, 247 N.E.2d 153, 156, 299 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193.
37. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-d(3) (Supp. 1968).
38. 24 N.Y.2d 168, 172, 247 N.E.2d 153, 155, 299 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193. Contra, Morgan,
Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 165 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Morgan] where the author states: "If the
rules excluding relevant testimony tendered by competent witnesses had their origin in a
supposed inferiority of jurors to judges, they need serious reexamination in this country.
The vast increase in literacy among the classes from which jurors are drawn, and the
political selection and popular election of judges have greatly narrowed the gap between
the capacities of the two." Id. at 191. This artide was cited in another context by the
Jackson Court, 378 U.S. at 388-89 n.15. It is well recognized that an ambivalent attitude
exists about the relative reliability of juries. On the one hand, for example, there is language
such as that of the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) contrasting
the "common-sense judgment of a jury" with the "perhaps less sympathetic reaction of
the single judge". Id. at 156. On the other hand there is language such as that of the same
court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (decided the same day as Duncan):
"[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Id. at 135. Such
conflict regarding the merits and limitations of the jury system is not of recent origin.
"[V]irtually from its inception, it [i.e., the jury system] has been the subject of deep con-
troversy, attracting at once the most extravagant praise and the most harsh criticism." H.
Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 4 (1966). "[A]fter two hundred years, the debate
over the jury system, with distinguished participants on both sides, is still going on apace."
Id. at 7. For an excellent brief outline of the controversy over the relative merits of the jury
system see id. at 7-9. See also Broeder, The Functions of the Jury Facts or Fictions?, 21
U. Chi. L. Rev. 386 which suggests that some of the ambivalence toward juries results
from an imperfect understanding of juries' functions and abilities, despite the fact that the
jury system "has been in vogue for more than three centuries." Id. at 386. An examination
of the controversy as reflected in four recent decisions of the Supreme Court will be
found in 69 Colum. L. Rev. 419 (1969).
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consideration that the capacity to identify, understand, and distinguish in-
tricate legal issues may not be equivalent to immunity from both conscious
and subconscious influences created by the knowledge of evidence indicating
guilt 3 9 The court failed to recognize that the Jackson opinion, in approving
the Massachusetts procedure for jury trials, was careful to note that the judge's
determination on the issue of voluntariness is made at a "preliminary" hearing,
"separate and aside from issues of the reliability of the confession and the guilt
or innocence of the accused .2,0 The reasoning of the court failed to con-
sider that while the Jackson opinion did clearly evidence distrust of a jury's
ability to separate the issues,41 it also acknowledged that judges too have been
known to fail to distinguish between the issues of voluntariness and truthful-
ness.! 2 While this occurrence may be rare, the validity of a procedure which
39. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 402 where Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent, com-
ments on the reasoning that a jury which is convinced of a defendant's guilt may be
unwilling to disregard a coerced confession because they believe the guilty should be pun-
ished. He noted that: "This is a possibility, of a nature that is inherent in any confession
fact-finding by human fact-finders--a possibility present perhaps as much in judges as in
jurors." See also Morgan at 169 where the author states: "It is a familiar fiction that the
trial judge in equity cases regularly performs this psychological feat [i.e., wiping his mind
clean of objectionable evidence which he has heard]. But there is no trial lawyer . . .
who is not convinced that the trial judge is purporting to strain out the water of
prejudice from the milk of legitimate evidence through a totally ineffective mental sieve."
In another article cited in another context by the Jackson Court, 378 U.S. at 382,
the author in discussing this problem says: "This is not to suggest that the trial judge is
necessarily immune to public pressure.... Nor is it to suggest that the judge can always
prevent his judgment regarding the defendant's guilt from affecting his disposition of the
voluntariness issue." Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility
Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 327 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Meltzer].
See also C. McCormick, Evidence § 112 (1954); 11 S.D. L. Rev. 70, 81 (1966).
40. 378 US. at 378 n.8. The Wigmore or "orthodox" rule, the only other procedure
explicitly approved by the Court, also provides for a separate hearing on the issue of
voluntariness. See 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (3d ed. 1940). It should also be noted that
cross-examination of the defendant at the pretrial hearing may not go to "the merits," Le.,
any issue which goes to the truth of the confession. United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954
(4th Cir. 1965); People v. Lacy, 25 App. Div. 2d 788, 270 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (3d Dep't 1966)
(per curiam). As a further precaution to insure separation of the issues and to prevent the
jury from being influenced by the judge's determination at the pretrial hearing, the judge's
decision may not be made known to the jury at the subsequent trial. United States v. Inman,
352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965); People v. Stewart, 25 App. Div. 2d 483, 266 N.Y.S.2d 538
(4th Dep't 1966). "The fallacy of this attempt is obvious in that it is based on the assump-
tion that the members of the jury neither know nor understand the operation of the pro-
cedure. Those jurors who do understand the procedure would certainly recognize that a
confession would not be submitted to them unless it had already been deemed voluntary
by the judge." Comment, An Analysis of the Procedures Used to Determine the Voluntari-
ness of Confessions: and a Solution, 11 S.D. L. Rev. 70, 83 (1966). One writer maintains
that the judge ought to withhold a written opinion on the pretrial hearing until after the
trial. N. Sobel, The New Confession Standards, "Miranda v. Arizona" 120 (1966).
41. 378 U.S. at 378-89.
42. Id. at 386 n.13 citing Meltzer at 320-21.
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gives the defendant adequate protection "most of the time" must be questioned.
In addition, the Jackson Court, discussing the threats to a defendant's consti-
tutional rights under the old New York system, observed that an accused may
be deterred from testifying on the voluntariness issue in the presence of the
fact-finding body which will decide the ultimate issue of guilt. 43 The Court
stated that:
The fear of ... impeachment and extensive cross-examination in the presence of the
jury that is to pass on guilt or innocence as well as voluntariness may induce a
defendant to remain silent, although he is perhaps the only source of testimony on
the facts underlying the claim of coercion. Where this occurs the determination of
voluntariness is made upon less than all of the relevant evidence.44
It should also be noted that in offering its own dictum in People v. Sykes as
support for its conclusion in Brown45 the court referred to a section of the N.Y.
Code of Criminal Procedure which does not deal with confessions. 40 The
section cited deals specifically with motions for the suppression of evidence
alleged to have been obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure in
the case of misdemeanors and violations. 47 The doctrine of confessions has
experienced an evolution distinct from that of search and seizure. 48 This fact
is reflected in the Code itself which deals with motions for the suppression of
alleged involuntary confessions in a separate section.'9 There is nothing in the
sections dealing specifically with confessions which would lend support to the
court's determination. 50
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court, while recognizing the interest of
society in apprehending and convicting the guilty by means of efficient crim-
inal procedures, have established a trend in which major attention is also
given to assuring adequate protection for the constitutional rights of the accused,
especially in the delicate area of confessions.5' The rationale of Jackson,
viewed in light of this trend, requires, as a minimum, that the accused in a
nonjury trial be afforded a "separate" hearing, prior to trial, on the isolated
issue of the voluntariness of a contested confession.
43. Id. at 389 n.16.
44. Id.
45. 24 N.Y.2d at 172-73, 247 N.E2d at 156, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
46. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-d(3) (Supp. 1968).
47. Id.
48. See 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 815-20 (3d ed. 1940).
49. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 813-f-i (Supp. 1968). This section dealing with confessions
constitutes Tit. II-C, Pt. VI of the Code while the section cited by the court is found In
Tit. II-B, Pt. VI.
50. Id.
51. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Mathis v. United States, 391
U.S. 1 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See also Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poison-
ous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 579 (1968).
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Taxation-Taxpayer Must Establish That Tax Avoidance Was Not a
Purpose For Accumulation of Earnings In Order to Obtain Refund of
Accumulated Earnings Tax.-Taxpayer was a sole shareholder business
corporation. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed an accumulated
earnings tax' deficiency for the years 1960 and 1961. Taxpayer paid the assess-
ment and instituted a suit for a refund in the district court for the western
district of Tennessee. 2 The jury found that, although taxpayer had accumu-
lated its earnings "beyond the reasonable needs of the business,"3 it had not
done so "for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its share-
holders."4 On the basis of these findings, the trial court rendered judgment for
taxpayer. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the Government contended that the
trial court erroneously led the jury to believe that, in order to apply the tax,
it was necessary that tax avoidance be the sole purpose for the unreasonable
accumulation of earnings. 5 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the tax
1. The accumulated earnings tax is an additional tax, sometimes referred to as a penalty
tax, imposed on certain domestic and foreign corporations formed or availed of to avoid
an income tax on shareholders by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate beyond
the reasonable needs of the business. 3 P-H 1969 Fed. Taxes U 21,331. The tax is imposed
on the accumulated taxable income at a rate of 2732% of the accumulated taxable income
not in excess of $100,000, plus 38Y2% of the accumulated taxable income in excess of
$100,000. Id. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 533 (at issue in the present case) establishes a
presumption of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to shareholders in cases
where the earnings and profits of a corporation are allowed to accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of the business. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 535 defines "accumulated taxable
income" and provides for a credit for that portion of the earnings and profits retained
for the reasonable needs of the business, with a minimum lifetime credit of $100,000. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 537 provides that the "reasonable needs of the business" shall
include the "reasonably anticipated needs." See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 531-37.
2. WVhen a deficiency is assessed, a taxpayer has three possible courses of action: (1)
Without paying the assessment, he can appeal the Commissioner's findings in the Tax Court,
where the proceedings would be held before a judge without a jury. An advantage of this
procedure is that the judge is an expert in the tax field, and the taxpayer can avoid
placing his case before an inexpert jury. However, if the taxpayer loses, he will be charged
interest on the unpaid assessment. (2) The taxpayer can pay the assessment and file for
a refund in the Court of Claims, where the proceedings would be held before a judge
without a jury. Although this stops the running of interest, the judge may not be an expert
in the tax field. The advantage of avoiding a lay jury would therefore be somewhat dimin-
ished by bringing the case before an inexpert judge. (3) The taxpayer can pay the assess-
ment, as did plaintiff here, and file for a refund in a district court, where he would receive
a jury trial.
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 533.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 532. This finding concludes that the taxpayer had suc-
cessfully rebutted the presumption of prohibited purpose of § 533(a).
5. "At the conclusion of the trial, the Government specifically requested that the jury
be instructed that: '[lt is not necessary that avoidance of shareholder's tax be the sole
purpose for the unreasonable accumulation of earnings; it is sufficient if it is one of the
purposes for the company's accumulation policy.' The instruction was refused and the
Court instructed the jury in the terms of the statute that tax avoidance had to be 'the
purpose' of the accumulations." United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 298 (1969).
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would apply if tax avoidance was the "dominant, controlling, or impelling mo-
tive"6 for the accumulation. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals, holding that in order to rebut the presumption that an un-
reasonable accumulation of earnings and profits was for the purpose of avoid-
ing the income tax with respect to individual shareholders, the taxpayer must
establish that tax avoidance with respect to shareholders was not a purpose for
the unreasonable accumulation of earnings. United States v. Donruss Co., 393
U.S. 297, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969).
Since the adoption of the first internal revenue statute in 1913, 7 it has been
apparent that the corporate form, especially the close corporation," can be used
to lessen the tax burden on the individual taxpayer, as corporate income tax
rates are generally lower than those on individuals.9 However, any profits later
distributed will be subject to double taxation, as corporate dividends in excess
of $100 are taxed as ordinary income.10 The obvious method of avoiding this
double taxation is to allow corporate earnings to accumulate in the corporation
rather than to distribute them to the individual shareholders, who would then
have to pay the personal income tax rates on the funds distributed." It should
also be noted that if earnings are allowed to accumulate in a closely held corpo-
ration, the accumulated funds might readily be used to the shareholders' ad-
vantage, accumulated until the income position of the shareholders would make
a distribution more desirable,12 or reclaimed later at capital gains rates through
liquidation of the corporation. 13 Congress, aware of these possibilities, began a
series of attempts to prevent such use of the corporate form by imposing taxes
upon unreasonably accumulated earnings. The history of these taxes shows a
continuing congressional intent to make them more practically effective.
Originally, when an accumulated earnings tax was assessed, the individual
shareholder was taxed as if he had received a proportionate share of the ac-
cumulated earnings, even where no income had been distributed. 14 The In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1921 shifted the tax burden levied on accumulated
6. Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 297
(1969) (emphasis added).
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1913, 38 Stat. 114.
8. See Comment, Accumulated Earnings and the Reasonableness Test of Section 537,
43 Tul. L. Rev. 129, 130 n.13 (1968).
9. At present, there is a maximum income tax rate of approximately 70% on individuals
and approximately 48%7 on corporations. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1, 11. This does
not include the 10% surcharge now in effect.
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 116(a), 301(c), 316(a).
11. As an example, if a corporation has profits of $100,000 in 1968, it will pay an
income tax of approximately $41,500. If the company then distributes the remaining
$58,500 to its sole stockholder, he may have to pay up to 70%, or $41,000, of that as per-
sonal income tax, leaving him with approximately $17,500 of the original $100,000 the
corporation earned. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1, 11. This is an effective income tax rate
of 82.5%, and does not include the 10% surcharge now in effect.
12. See Comment, supra note 8, at 129.
13. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 331, 1001-02.




earnings from the individual shareholder to the corporation, where it has re-
mained until the present.' 5 The original Internal Revenue Code also provided
that accumulation beyond the reasonable needs of the business "shall be prima
fade evidence of a fraudulent purpose to escape" the accumulated earnings
tax.' 6 Even so, difficulty in proving a fraudulent purpose made the tax largely
ineffective, and in 1918 Congress deleted the word "fraudulent" from the
Code.17 Only minor changes were made until 1934,28 when personal holding
companies were exempted from the general accumulated earnings tax and sub-
jected to a tax on all undistributed income, regardless of purpose.10 In 1937,
Congress established a separate method for taxing the United States shareholders
of foreign personal holding companies, again without regard to corporate
intent.20 In 1938, Congress required the taxpayer corporation to prove, by a
clear preponderance of the evidence, the absence of the purpose to avoid the
tax on shareholders in order to avoid the accumulated earnings tax.2 ' From
1938 to 1954, no significant changes were made in the accumulated earnings
tax, even though there was considerable discussion of the problems involved in
its administration.2 In 1954, the new Code incorporated several new proposals,
but no change was made in the degree of improper purpose required to impose
the tax.2a
Under the present tax provisions,2 4 there are two preconditions to an accumu-
lated earnings tax liability. First, there must be an unreasonable accumulation
of earnings. Second, there must be some degree of purpose to avoid payment of
individual income taxes by shareholders. 5
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1921, § 220, 42 Stat. 247. See H.R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., Ist
Sess. 12-13 (1921). The change was prompted by the decision in Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920) which held that corporate earnings cannot be taxed as ordinary income
to the stockholders, but must be taxed as a capital gain.
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1913, § H1(A) (2), 38 Stat. 166, 167 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 532-33).
17. Rev. Act of 1918, § 220, 40 Stat. 1072 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 532). See
S. Rep. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1918).
18. 393 U.S. at 304. See Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, 82d Cong., 2d Sess,
The Taxation of Corporate Surplus Accumulations 206 (Joint Comm. Print 1952).
19. Rev. Act of 1934, §§ 102, 351, 48 Stat. 702, 751 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 532).
For the definition of "all undistributed income" see Int. Rev. Code of 19S4, § 545(a).
20. Rev. Act of 1937,' §§ 201, 337, 50 Stat. 818, 822 (now Int. Rev. Code of 19S4,
§ 551).
21. Rev. Act of 1938, § 102, 52 Stat. 483 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 532). The
change was thought to make it clear that the burden of proving intent, rather than the
lesser burden of producing evidence on the question, was to be on the taxpayer. See S. Rep.
No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 16 (1938).
22. See Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, supra note 18.
23. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 531-37. Congress was urged to adopt a test of purpose
similar to that proposed by the taxpayer in the present case, but refused to do so. See
Hearings on Forty Topics Pertaining to the Gen. Revision of the Int. Rev. Code Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st Seas., pt. 3, at 2142 (1953).
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 531-37.
25. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 532. Theoretically, it is possible that the accumulated
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Generally, an accumulation is unreasonable if it exceeds the amount a prudent
businessman would consider appropriate for present business needs, including
the reasonably anticipated future needs of the business.2 0 The determination
of unreasonableness ultimately rests on an evaluation of the reasons for the
accumulation; however, the test is an objective one in that the issue is not
the subjective intent of the shareholders, but what actual plans were made
and what affirmative actions were taken which show that the accumulation
was for business purposes.2 7 If it is found that the corporation has unreasonably
accumulated earnings, this is determinative of the purpose to avoid the income
tax with respect to shareholders unless the taxpayer proves otherwise.28 In at-
tempting to make the determination of subjective intent as objective and prac-
tical as possible, Congress established this presumption of improper purpose
in those cases where an unreasonable accumulation of earnings had been proved.
The burden to rebut this presumption is an intentionally heavy one.2 0 The
earnings tax may be applied to a corporation even where the accumulation of earnings has
been found to be reasonable. Section 532 imposes the tax on any corporation formed or
availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to shareholders. Theo-
retically, should the accumulation of earnings be found to be reasonable, the burden of
proof would still be on the taxpayer to show that its purpose in accumulating the earnings
was not tax avoidance. In such a circumstance, the taxpayer's burden is eased by the fact
that it has avoided the presumption of section 533(a). In addition, the absence of an undue
accumulation is normally repugnant to the existence of the proscribed purpose. As a prac-
tical matter, however, where the taxpayer proves the reasonableness of its accumulation,
it will almost surely avoid the accumulated earnings tax. See Duke Laboratories, Inc. v.
United States, 222 F. Supp. 400 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964) ; John
P. Scripps Newspapers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 453 (1965); Vuono-Lione, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 506 (1965) (dictum); Fotocrafters, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1401 (1960); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1954); Arm-
strong, Section 531-Recent Cases Suggest New Problems, 39 Taxes 853, 866-67 (1961);
Canty, The Accumulated Earnings Tax 1954 Reforms: An Appraisal, 2 U. San Francisco L.
Rev. 242, 247-53 (1968); Lowery, Accumulated Earnings Tax Under the 1954 Code, 44 Ill.
B.J. 656, 658 (1956); Comment, supra note 8, at 132.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(a) (1959). See also 3 P-H 1969 Fed. Taxes 9 21,323.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b) (1959) briefly outlines some of the grounds for accumu-
lation which, if supported by sufficient facts, are considered reasonable. Such grounds in-
clude: provision for bona fide expansion of business or replacement of plant; acquisition
of a business enterprise; provision for necessary working capital; provision for retirement
of bona fide business indebtedness; and provision for investments or loans to suppliers or
customers if necessary to maintain the business of the corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(c)
(1959) outlines certain objectives which are suspect as reasons for corporate accumulation.
These include: loans to shareholders; the expenditure of corporate funds for the personal
benefit of the shareholders; loans to relatives, friends, or shareholders having no reasonable
relation to the conduct of the business; investments in properties or securities unrelated
to the corporate business; and retention of earnings and profits to provide for unrealistic
hazards. See also 3 P-H 1969 Fed. Taxes II 21,328-37.
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 533(a).
29. Originally, the presumption of purpose to avoid the income tax was merely a prima
facia presumption. Int. Rev. Code of 1913, § II(A) (2), 38 Stat. 167 (now Int. Rev. Code
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effect of the presumption has been to establish the reasonableness test as the
crucial consideration in nearly every accumulated earnings tax case,30 even
though the ultimate fact at issue is the purpose behind the accumulation. 31 Even
so, taxpayers have occasionally chosen to admit the unreasonableness of the
accumulation, as the taxpayer did here, and rely solely on their ability to rebut
the presumption of prohibited purpose.
Section 533 states that the fact that earnings and profits are permitted to
accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative
of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to the shareholders. Since
the establishment of this presumption, there has been a conflict over the meaning
of the article "the." This conflict led to the establishment of four separate tests
for determining the degree of purpose other than tax avoidance necessary to
rebut the presumption.
The First32 and Sixth33 Circuits have adopted the dominant purpose test,
holding that the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to shareholders
must be the dominant, controlling or impelling motive for the accumulation of
earnings by a corporation. In Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner,3 4 the First
Circuit rejected the theory that Congress meant that tax avoidance could not
be one of the purposes for accumulation, partially because section 532 reads "the
purpose" and not "a purpose." The court instead relied on certain cases from
the gift and estate tax areas,35 apparently feeling that these areas of the law
are analogous. The Sixth Circuit, in Donruss, discussed the conflict among the
circuits and concluded, from a reading of section 532, that the dominant purpose
test was the most reasonable test to apply.30 The court rejected the a purpose
test as having sprung from a misreading or stretching of the Supreme Court's
decision in Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co. 37
of 1954, §§ 532-33). In 1938, the statute was revised and strengthened by replacing the
phrase "prima fade evidence of the purpose" with the term "determinative." The change
was "to strengthen this Section by requiring the taxpayer by a clear preponderance of the
evidence to prove the absence of any purpose to avoid surtaxes upon the shareholders
after it has been determined that the earnings and profits had been unreasonably accumu-
lated." S. Rep. No. 1567, supra note 21, at 5.
30. See Weithorn, What Constitutes a "Reasonable" Corporate Accumulation?, N.Y.U.
17th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 299, 308 (1959) ; Comment, supra note 8, at 31.
31. Wallick, The § 531 Penalty Tax: What is an Unreasonable Accumulation?, 4 Prac.
Law. 31-32 (Nov. 1958).
32. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 1960); accord,
Apollo Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966).
33. Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 297
(1969); accord, Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1968), vacated
per curiarn, 393 U.S. 478 (1969).
34. 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
35. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630
(1946); United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
36. 384 F2d at 297-98.
37. 318 U.S. 693 (1943). See Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir.
1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 297 (1969). The courts which adhere to the dominant purpose test
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The Fourth,38 Eighth,89 Ninth4" and Tenth 4' Circuits have adhered to the
view that, in order for the accumulated earnings tax to apply, the purpose of
avoiding the income tax with respect to shareholders must have been one of
the determinative purposes of the corporation in accumulating its earnings.
In developing this theory, both World Publishing Co. v. United States42 and
Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner43 rejected the sole purpose test as unwar-
ranted by the language of the statute. These circuits seem to accept this test
as a workable one which is not inconsistent with congressional intent as ex-
hibited in the language of the statute. While this appears to be an intermediate
position 44 between the dominant purpose test and the a purpose test, the differ-
ence between it and the dominant purpose test is slight, if there is any prac-
tical difference at all.
The Fifth Circuit, like most of the lower courts, has been satisfied to rely
solely on the wording of the statute,43 and has left the interpretation of the
statute to the finder of fact at the trial level.
The Second46 and Third47 Circuits had previously adopted the a purpose
test, basing their decisions in large part on the language of Mr. Justice Roberts
in Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co.48 These courts interpreted the phrase
"induced or aided in inducing" the accumulation of earnings as meaning "a pur-
pose" or "one of the purposes" for the accumulation.
construe the phrase "or aided in inducing" used by the Supreme Court, 318 U.S. at 699, as a
parenthetical phrase which was not employed to deal with the issue of what degree of pur-
pose to avoid income tax need be established in order to properly apply the accumulated
earnings tax.
38. Fenco, Inc. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 317 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd, 348 F.2d 456
(4th Cir. 1965).
39. Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 304 (1955), aff'd, 253
F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).
40. Cummins Diesel Sales, Inc. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 746 (D. Ore. 1962), aff'd,
321 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1963).
41. World Publishing Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Okla. 1947), aff'd,
169 F.2d 186, (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1949). For a recent decision
adhering to World Publishing, see Henry Van Hummell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 746
(10th Cir. 1966), aff'g 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1765 (1964).
42. 72 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Okla. 1947), aff'd, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 911 (1949).
43. 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 304 (1955), aff'd, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).
44. 393 U.S. at 299 n.1.
45. See Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961), aft'g 19 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 195 (1960), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected the dominant purpose test as an emasculation of the congressionally im-
posed presumption, but it did not go any further toward clarifying its position.
46. Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 346 (1942), aff'd, 137 F.2d 424 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943); accord, United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc.,
337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'g 222 F. Supp. 400 (D. Conn. 1963).
47. Times Publishing Co. v. United States, 11 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1228 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
48. 318 U.S. 693 (1943).
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Donruss was an excellent case to resolve this conflict among the circuits.
The issue before the Supreme Court was a narrow one.4 Neither party chal-
lenged the trial court's instructions on the issue of the reasonableness of the
accumulation, nor did they challenge the jury's finding that the accumulation
was unreasonable.50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely "to resolve
a conflict among the circuits over the degree of 'purpose' necessary for the
application of the accumulated earnings tax, and because of the importance
of that question in the administration of the tax." 51
The Court, in a 6-3 decision written by Mr. Justice Marshall, dealt solely
with this narrow issue. The Government contended that in order to rebut the
presumption, the taxpayer would have to establish that tax avoidance with
respect to shareholders was ,not one of the purposes for the accumulation of
earnings beyond the reasonable needs of the business. Plaintiff argued that
the taxpayer could rebut the presumption by demonstrating that tax avoidance
was not the dominant, controlling or impelling motive for the accumulation . 2
The Court first investigated the language of the statute in an attempt to
discover the congressional intent behind the use of the phrase "availed of for
the purpose."  Both parties argued that the language of the statute supported
their respective- tests. Taxpayer argued that Congress could have used the
article "a" in sections 532 and 533 if it had intended to adopt the Govern-
ment's test. Instead, Congress used the article "the" in the operative part of
the statute, thus indicating that, for the tax to apply, tax avoidance need be
the dominant motive for the accumulation. 54 The Government argued that the
taxpayer's construction would give too narrow a scope to the word "the." Instead,
the Government contended that the Court should focus on the entire phrase
"availed of for the purpose," stating that any language of limitation should
logically modify "availed of" rather than "purpose." The Government also ar-
gued that Congress had dealt with similar problems before in other parts of the
Code, and had used other terms such as "principal purpose,"-5 and "used
principally,"56 which could have been used in sections 532 and 533(a) if
Congress had so intended.57 The majority found both parties' arguments
inconclusive.58 The Court rejected taxpayer's claim that Congress would have
used the article "a" instead of "the" if that were its intention, stating that
49. 393 Us. at 301.
50. Id.
S1. 393 US. at 299 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 301.
53. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 532 (emphasis added).
54. 393 U.S. at 301-02. This argument was adopted by the First Circuit in Young
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (Ist Cir. 1960).
55. See lnt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 269(a), 357(b)(1).
56. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 355(a) (1) (B).
57. 393 US. at 302.
58. Id. The minority agreed with this condusion. Thus, the Court %was unanimous in
reversing, and differed only on the critical issue of what degree of purpose is necessary.
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"there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to
attach any particular significance to the use of the article 'the.' ,
The Court did not discuss the issue of whether the language and intent of
sections 532 and 533 are analogous to those of section 2035(a) of the Code,
which deals with estate taxes.0 0 Taxpayer argued that the inclusion in the gross
estate, under section 2035(a), of the amount of a gift made in contemplation
of death is meant to accomplish the same objective as the accumulated earnings
tax; that is, to keep individuals from avoiding the higher estate tax rates by
making gifts at the lower gift tax rate just prior to death.0 1 Taxpayer also
argued that both sections establish presumptions of the prohibited purpose of
tax avoidance which take effect once the Government has proven certain facts,0 2
in which case the taxpayer must overcome the presumption by a clear prepon-
derance of the evidence. The Court rejected both arguments, stating without
further reasoning that the language, purpose, and legislative history of that
area of the Code are entirely different from those of the accumulated earnings
tax. The Court may have overstated the difference between these areas of the
Code at the expense of the above stated significant similarities.03 However,
even if a proper analogy could be drawn and the Court persuaded of its valid-
ity, such an analogy would clearly not show that Congress intended this article
"the" to have any particular significance. Even more tenuous was the attempt
made by the courtof appeals to draw an analogy between the cases interpreting
the purpose test of section 532 and those interpreting the motive test of sec-
tion 2035 to determine whether a gift was made "in contemplation of death."0 4
Here, the analogy is stretched beyond the actual language of the statutes to
the reasoning and interpretations of another court, without firsthand know-
ledge of the facts and reasoning upon which the court based its decision. This
attempted analogy is far removed from the one between the actual language
of the statutes. Given the admitted differences in history and language between
the two statutes, therefore, the analogy is more difficult to establish and, even
if established, less determinative of the issue than the one based on language.
Thus, although the Court may have overstated its position, all nine Justices
agreed that either the analogy could not be drawn, or if drawn, would not be
determinative of the issue at bar.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Denniston v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1939).
62. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 533(a) states that "the fact that earnings and profits ...
are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be deter-
minative of the purpose to avoid the income tax." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035(b) states
that "[ilf the decedent within a period of three years ending with the date of his death ...
transferred an interest in property . ..such transfer . .. shall, unless shown to the con-
trary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death . .. ."
63. But see Note, Accumulated Earnings Tax-Taxpayer's Purpose in Accumulating In-
come, 22 Sw. L.J. 495, 499-500 (1968).
64. See Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S.
297 (1969). See also Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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The Court next attempted to discover the congressional intent behind the
statutes. It was unanimous in finding the legislative history inconclusive as to
the test to be applied to rebut the presumption. Nonetheless, it concluded that
"the legislative history of the accumulated earnings tax demonstrates a con-
tinuing concern with the use of the corporate form to avoid income tax on a
corporation's shareholders. Numerous methods were employed to prevent this
practice, all of which proved unsatisfactory in one way or another."05 The
Court also concluded that Congress, in attempting to deal effectively with the
problem, emphasized unreasonable accumulation as the most significant factor
in applying the tax, principally because reasonableness may be determined
objectively, while motive requires an investigation into the subjective intent
of the shareholders.6 The establishment of the presumption in section 533 (a)
was an attempt to make the necessarily subjective question of intent more
objectively determinable. The Court rejected the dominant purpose test be-
cause allowing a taxpayer by his own testimony to rebut the presumption of
section 533(a) merely by proving that at least one other motive was equal
to tax avoidance would go a long way toward destroying the presumption that
Congress created.67 The final decision as to which test would be applied, there-
fore, was based not on precedent, but on practical necessity. Here, for the first
time, the Court differed. The majority, after concluding that Congress desired
the inquiry to be as objective as possible, and aware of the practical difficulties
involved in the administration of a statute whose imposition depends in part
on ascertaining the subjective intent of interested parties, adopted the a Pur-
pose test proposed by the Government. The language used by Mr. Justice
Marshall in delivering this decision is significant: "[The relevant legislative]
history leads us to conclude that the test proposed by the Government is
consistent with the intent of Congress and is necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the accumulated earnings tax." 6s The Court did not adopt the a Purpose
test because it was required by the statute, nor was it specifically required by
the legislative history. The test was adopted because it was "consistent" with
the majority's interpretation of the intent of Congress, and because it was
"necessary" to effectuate the purpose of the accumulated earnings tax. The
majority, in effect, adopted the most practical method of imposing the tax
which was not inconsistent with its interpretation of the congressional intent.
The Supreme Court has thus gone a long way toward ridding the courts, and
the statute, of the difficult problem of subjectivity. In doing so, however, it
65. 393 U.S. at 307.
66. Id. The emphasis on the reasonableness of an accumulation at the expense of a deter-
uination of subjective motive would seem to put the conservative, perhaps overcautious,
businessman at a disadvantage. Such a man might wish to accumulate earnings to protect
his business against a hazard which might appear unrealistic to a tax investigator a year
or two later. Thus, it is possible that an overcautious businessman may place himself in
jeopardy, even where he is not considering the possible tax saving.
67. See Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1961); United
Business Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754, 755 (2d Cir. 1933).
68. 393 US. at 303 (emphasis added).
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has also come very close to taking away from the taxpayer one edge of his
double-edged sword.0 9 The taxpayer is now faced with an almost impossible
burden in attempting to rebut the presumption of prohibited purpose. In order
to do so, he must show by a clear preponderance of the evidence that tax
avoidance was not a purpose for the unreasonable accumulation. Recognizing
this, the majority attempted to soothe the fears of taxpayers by stating in
the last paragraph of the opinion that "purpose" means more than the mere
knowledge of tax consequences, undoubtedly present in nearly every case.Y'
Although it is true that mere knowledge is not purpose, the taxpayer is now
faced with the burden of proving that, although he knew that he could save
himself tax dollars by allowing earnings to accumulate, this was not even one
of the purposes for the accumulation.
The minority, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, concurred with much
of the analysis expressed by the majority, including its interpretation of con-
gressional intent. However, Mr. Justice Harlan noted that Congress inten-
tionally gave the taxpayer a "last clear chance" 71 to prove that, despite the
unreasonableness of its accumulation, it was not for the proscribed purpose.
The minority disagreed with the a purpose test because, as a practical matter,
it would effectively deny to the taxpayer this "last clear chance." The minor-
ity's argument, admittedly based on common sense grounds, 72 is a strong and
persuasive one. They argue that the accumulated earnings tax provisions are,
in practice, applied only to close corporations. The few shareholders will almost
always know that the accumulation of corporate earnings would result in indi-
vidual tax savings. The jury will be instructed that the tax is to be imposed
if avoidance of the shareholder's tax is one of the purposes for the accumulation.
Given these circumstances, the minority believed that the semantic difference
between the meanings of purpose and knowledge was so slight and difficult
to establish as to be incomprehensible to jurors.7 3 Also, the minority pointed
out that the Court's opinion left some question as to whether the caution
against confusing knowledge with purpose must be a part of the charge to the
jury. If it were not to be a part of the Court's instructions, then there was
little left of the taxpayer's "last clear chance." Even if the caution were in-
cluded, it would be extraordinarily difficult for the taxpayer to convince a
jury that the knowledge of a tax saving did not in any way contribute to the
decision to accumulate earnings.
69. See Canty, The Accumulated Earnings Tax 1954 Reforms: An Appraisal, supra
note 25, at 272.
70. "It is still open for the taxpayer to show that even though knowledge of the tax
consequences was present, that knowledge did not contribute to the decision to accumulate
earnings." 393 U.S. at 309.
71. Id. at 310.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 311. Black's Law Dictionary 1012 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) also lists willfully and




The minority's conclusion, that the a purpose test would, in practice, deprive
the taxpayer of his "last clear chance," is probably quite correct. The test
proposed by the minority, however, is also open to criticism. The minority
proposes that "the jury should be instructed to impose the tax if it finds that
the taxpayer would not have accumulated earnings but for its knowledge that
a tax saving would result."7 4 This test is somewhere between the a purpose
test and the dominant purpose test. Its effect would seem to be very close to
that of the dominant purpose test in emasculating the presumption of pro-
hibited purpose by requiring inquiry into subjective intent. Under the but
for test, the taxpayer could avoid the penalty merely by proving that tax
avoidance was not the instigating factor-that it did not initiate the accumula-
tion. This is very dose to saying that it was not the dominant or controlling
purpose. Once again, the trier of fact would be required to look into the mind
of the taxpayer to determine, first, whether tax avoidance was a purpose, and
then, whether the taxpayer would have accumulated the earnings of the
corporation but for the known fact that he would thereby save tax dollars.
Therefore, though it may be almost impossible to separate purpose from
knowledge under the a purpose test, the but for test would seem to require
the same inquiry, and would add to it the equally difficult element of inquiry
into subjective intent.
Thus, the a purpose test eases the burden of the trier of fact by making his
inquiry more objective, while emphasizing the punitive intent of Congress.
The but for test emphasizes the intent of Congress to give the taxpayer a
"last clear chance," but it also partially defeats past congressional and judicial
attempts to make the accumulated earnings tax provisions more efficiently
applicable. Since the main legislative intent in establishing the accumulated
earnings tax was to punish violators and to prevent violations by threat of
punishment, as Congress only secondarily intended to give the taxpayer a
"last dear chance" to avoid the tax, the a purpose test must prevail. Though
the minority's criticisms of the a purpose test are valid, the test is not incon-
sistent with the intent of Congress and, if not practically necessary, it is at
least the best one available to effectuate the purposes of the accumulated
earnings tax.
The immediate effects of the Donruss decision will be to establish a single
purpose test and make the administration of the tax uniform and more efficient.
It should also encourage distribution of corporate accumulations, as it will
put the taxpayer on notice that, in order to avoid the tax, he will now have to
prove that the accumulation of earnings was for the reasonable needs of the
business. Should he fail in this, he will face an almost impossible task in
trying to rebut the presumption of prohibited purpose. Clearly, this is the
result desired by both the Supreme Court and Congress. For those cases where
the tax is assessed, it would seem that an even higher percentage of cases will
be tried and decided solely on the issue of reasonableness. The taxpayer must
now look upon the issue of purpose only as a last, desperate hope.
74. 393 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
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Torts-New York Abolishes Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine.-Plantiff-
mother was seriously injured in a collision while riding as a passenger in an
automobile owned by her and driven by her unemancipated sixteen-year-old
son. Plaintiff commenced separate negligence actions against both her son and
the driver of the other vehicle. Her son, represented by counsel of her in-
surance company and relying on the parent-child immunity doctrine, pleaded
his status as an unemancipated child of the plaintiff as an affirmative defense.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on that ground,1 and its decision
was affirmed by the appellate division. 2 However, the New York Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the parent-child immunity for non-willful
torts should be abolished. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d
192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
In its strictest form, the parent-child immunity doctrine bars an action
"between parent and minor child for personal torts, whether they are intentional
or negligent in character."'8 Apparently there was no such prohibition at
common law,4 although several American courts have disagreed.5 The first
American case to enunciate the doctrine was the 1891 Mississippi decision
of Hewlett v. George,6 which denied recovery in an action by a minor against
a parent who had wrongfully committed her to an insane asylum. The court,
citing no authority, reasoned that immunity was necessary to preserve "the
repose of families and the best interests of society. . . 2,7 Adherence to this
principle of preserving domestic tranquility led to the perpetration of serious
injustice. Minor children were denied recovery for assault,8 brutal beating,9
and even rape.' 0
Recognizing the injustices that sometimes resulted from strict adherence
to the family immunity doctrine, the courts soon began to recognize special
circumstances that would allow such an action between parent and child.
The first exception the courts allowed was an action involving injury to
property." The apparent reasoning was that the child was a separate legal
person who had a right to property over which the parent had no control.' 2
1. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 52 Misc. 2d 412, 275 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
2. Gelbman v. GeIbman, 28 App. Div. 2d 826, 282 N.Y.S.2d 670 (2d Dep't 1967).
3. W. Prosser, Torts § 116, at 886 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as W. Prosser]. Courts
have not found any distinction between a suit of the parent against his child or the child
against his parent. See, e.g., Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis. 2d 372, 141 N.W.2d 208 (1966).
4. W. Prosser § 116, at 886; see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1059-63 (1930).
5. See, e.g., Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Redding v. Redding,
235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925).
Contra, Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
6. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
7. Id. at 705, 9 So. at 887.
8. Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924).
9. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
10. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
11. See W. Prosser § 116, at 886; McCurdy, supra note 4, at 1057-58. See also Lamb v.
Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895).
12. See note 11 supra.
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Later, the courts allowed actions when the parent had died or abandoned his
child,13 or when the child had become emancipated. 4 Here the courts argued
that the parental relationship had been abandoned or destroyed. Finally, it
was found that if there existed "between the parties a relationship additional
to that of parent and child and the fact of parenthood (or the standing in
loco parentis) is in the circumstances merely incidental, or perhaps logically
irrelevant, the minor should be permitted to maintain his action if he could
have maintained it had the parent and child relation not been present."' 0
Thus the courts allowed an unemancipated minor to maintain a tort action
against his parents when a master-servant or carrier-passenger relationship
existed between the parties.'0 Likewise, in some cases they permitted actions
against a non-parent serving in loco parentis, as when he failed to provide
reasonable care or meted out unreasonable punishment.Y7 These many ex-
ceptions have led a court recently to conclude that the immunity doctrine
"has undergone a general erosion like the all-day sucker in the hands of a
small child until there isn't much left but the stick itself."18 Moreover, many
courts have limited the immunity to unintentional torts, allowing recovery
for personal injuries willfully infficted. The limiting effects of the special cir-
cumstances exceptions and the intentional tort doctrine, combined with the
constant movement towards abolition of all tort immunities and the growth
of liability insurance, have led to serious doubt as to the further validity of
the immunity. As a result, three states recently have totally abolished the
family immunity19 and three more have seriously limited the doctrine.
Yet, in New York, in Cannon v. Canwn,2' the court stated that abolition
of this immunity would place too great a burden on parenthood. This rule
was further solidified by Badigian v. Badigian,22 where the court found no
decisions sustaining this type of action, restated the argument of family unity,
and placed the burden of changing this rule upon the legislature.ea
13. Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.TH. 314, 211
A.2d 410 (1965); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930). Contra, Lasecki v.
Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).
14. See Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45
Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1903);
Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942).
15. Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 433 (1951).
16. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) (master-servant); Signs v. Signs,
156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) (business activity); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va.
11, 4 S.E2d 343 (1939) (carrier-passenger). Contra, Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d
636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
17. Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366,
206 N.W. 173 (1925). Contra, Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931).
18. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 204, 241 N.E2d 12, 14 (1968).
19. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967); Baits v. Bats, 273 Min. 419, 142 N.W.2d
66 (1966) ; Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
20. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 11. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968) ; Silesky v. Kelman, 281
Mlinn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
21. 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942). See also Boem v. Gridley & Sons, 187 Misc. 113,
63 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (parent v. child).
22. 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961).
23. Id. at 473-74, 174 N.E.2d at 719-20, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
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Nevertheless, barring special circumstances, the majority of courts continue
to uphold immunity for non-willful torts between parent and child, 24 although
some courts have abrogated the rule for intentional torts.25 Numerous reasons
have been advanced for maintaining this rule. The most prevalent is that
domestic harmony and tranquility would be disturbed by "the disruptive
risk of tort liability between parents and their unemancipated children, in
which relationship both parents and children-by nature and by law-have
reciprocal duties to perform .... 1-26 In many cases, however, family harmony
already has been disturbed beyond repair or, under the special cirucmstances,
harmony is not involved or endangered. In the case of willful torts, family
peace normally has already been destroyed.27 Even if no tort action is brought,
"personal violence and abuse may be punished by the criminal law, which
the child may be instrumental in setting in motion, or the custody of the
child may be taken from the parent; and these things disrupt domestic tran-
quility." 28 Thus, it would seem that abrogation of the immunity would not
seriously endanger family harmony.
A second argument advanced for the retention of the immunity claims
that the family exchequer would be depleted to the detriment of the other
minors in the family.29 However, it is clear that there exists no right of a
minor to equal distribution of his family's assets.3 0 Furthermore, this argu-
ment ignores "the parent's power to distribute his favors as he will, and
leaves out of the picture the depletion of the child's assets of health and
strength through the injury."'31 Most importantly, the increase of compulsory
insurance makes such a, suit more likely to enrich rather than deplete the
family coffers.
3 2
A third reason given for the retention of immunity is the possibility that
such a suit would endanger parental discipline and control.3 The assumption
underlying this argument is that the immunity will not produce abusive
results, since a parent's natural love and affection assures protection of the
child from injury. While this argument is usually valid in normal family
intercourse, when an activity such as driving an automobile "has nothing to
24. See the cases cited in Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 9 n.6 (Alas. 1967).
25. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y.
425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950). Seven
states have not expressly overruled prior cases upholding the parent-child immunity for
intentional torts. Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Smith v.
Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885
(1891); Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939); Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903);
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
26. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 429, 40 N.E.2d 236, 238 (1942).
27. See note 14 supra.
28. McCurdy, supra note 4, at 1075.
29. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
30. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
31. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 361, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930).
32. 33 St. John's L. Rev. 310, 313 (1959).
33. Rodebaugh v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 4 Mich. App. 559, 145 N.W.2d 401 (1966);
Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
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do with parental control and discipline, a suit involving such activity cannot
be said to undermine those sinews of family life." 34 In such a case, it seems
inequitable to bar compensation for injuries suffered. In addition, it appears
that parental discipline has lessened in importance over the decades as the
once rigorous restrictions upon family members have relaxed. 35
The final argument for the retention of the immunity, one which has become
more viable with the increased prevalence of liability insurance, is the danger
of fraud and collusion from friendly suits.30 Proponents of the abolition of
this doctrine, recognizing this problem, place their reliance on a vigilant jury
to ferret out such fradulent claims, since society's interest "in protecting
people from losses resulting from accidents should remain paramount., '
Moreover, if fraudulent claims increase alarmingly, legislatures have enacted
appropriate legislation making the presentation of a fraudulent claim a criminal
offense.38 It also appears that insurance companies may include clauses in
their contracts which would exclude members of the insured's family from
coverage 39 Such clauses have been construed strictly against the insurer but
upheld on the ground that they deny "claims by persons in whose favor the
insured would naturally be inclined to color the circumstances . ". ..- Fur-
thermore, the experience of states where the immunity between spouses has
been abolished indicates that such fears are largely unfounded.4' When the
immunity between spouses was abolished in New York,42 the legislature
simultaneously denied recovery by an insured's spouse "unless express pro-
vision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy."43 In addition,
it is widely recognized that the trend of the law is towards abolition of common
law tort immunities. They "have been vanishing with the advent of modern
means of transportation and the spread of insurance against liability of the
wrongdoer and protection for the sufferer. We cannot bury our heads in the
sand and ignore the new tendencies and conditions so notorious." 44
34. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 649, 251 P.2d 149, 153-54 (1952).
35. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 109, 22 N.E.2d 254, 255 (1939).
36. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960). See also W. Prosser § 116, at
889.
37. 23 N.Y.2d at 439, 245 N.E2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
38. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Code § 175.50 (1967): "A person is guilty of presenting a
false insurance claim when, with intent to defraud an insurer with respect to an alleged
claim of loss upon a contract of insurance, he knowingly presents to the insurer or to an
agent thereof a written instrument containing a false material statement relating to such
claim."
39. 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance § 131 (1963).
40. Dressier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 52 Tenn. App. 514, 517, 376 S.W.2d
700, 702 (Ct. App. 1963).
41. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 430-31, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966).
42. N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 3-313(2) (1964): "A married woman has a right of
action against her husband for his wrongful or tortious acts resulting to her in any personal
injury . . . as if they were unmarried, and she is liable to her husband for her wrongful
or tortious acts resulting in any such personal injury to her husband . . . as if they were
unmarried."
43. N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(3) (1941).
44. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 113, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1939).
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In Gelbman, the court of appeals took notice of the gradual erosion of the
parent-child immunity throughout the country in the seven years since
Badigian.45 It also noted that the legislature had failed to abolish this im-
munity, illustrating "the fact that the rule will be changed, if at all, by a
decision of this court."46 Finally, it found that an action by a parent against
his child was not essential for the preservation of family unity. In fact it
concluded that, since it would be a valid exercise of a parent's right to dis-
cipline his child, family unity would be preserved by this action.41 The court
then expanded its decision to abolish this immunity completely. It cited the
many exceptions to the immunity rule that "neither permit reconciliation
with the family immunity doctrine, nor provide a meaningful pattern of de-
parture from the rule. Rather they attest the primitive nature of the rule
and require its repudiation.148 It also recognized that the state's compulsory
automobile liability insurance effectively nullified the argument that family
harmony would be disrupted by such an action, astutely observing that "[ t] he
present litigation is, in reality, between the parent passenger and her insurance
carrier. Viewing the case in this light, we are unable to comprehend how
the family harmony will be enhanced by prohibiting this suit. '49 Finally,
the court concluded that a vigilant jury would prevent a rash of fraudulent
and collusive claims.r0
In spite of the total abolition of the immunity enunciated in Gelbman,
in a rare case the arguments based on maintenance of family harmony and
parental discipline remain valid, and retention of the immunity might be
the wisest choice. Two states, for example, have abolished the immunity
"texcept in two situations: (1) where the alleged negligent act involves an
exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged
negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect
to provisions of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and
other care." 51 Unfortunately, Gelbman makes no provision for situations such
as these, where a continued immunity may be beneficial. However, the court
did point out the importance of compulsory insurance in this case. It therefore
might reestablish this immunity when the child's or parent's activity is not
insured. Nevertheless, for the great majority of cases, the justifications for
maintaining the parent-child immunity have become antiquated and obsolete,
especially with the prevalence of liability insurance. Thus, the court has taken a
progressive and pragmatic step by eliminating it.
45. 23 N.Y.2d at 437, 245 N.E2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
49. Id. at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531-32.
50. Id. at 439, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
51. Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968); see Goller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1966). See also Tort Liability within the Family
Area-A Suggested Approach, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 610, 619 (1956).
